Pathétique

I had the pleasure of listening to the Appassionata, a sonata for piano composed by Ludwig von Beethoven, while sitting at my desk at work the other day.  It eternally amazes me that such a tempestuous piano sonata could have been written by someone who was deaf or had severe tinnitus secondary to contracting typhus.

The notes danced off of the walls as the soothing sounds of Beethoven’s Piano Sonata No. 14 in C-sharp minor, more commonly known as the “Moonlight” Sonata, floated through the air.  Ludwig’s genius and talent transcends the music.

In my opinion, greatness should be defined by the ability of one to supercede the limitations imposed upon him (or her) to flourish in their respective field.  In contrast, those that have been blessed with great talent but squander their gifts should be, and often are, cast off as failures and epic dissapointments.

Somewhere in that continuum lies the 2008 edition of the Dallas Cowboys.  The Dallas defensive performance should be closer to the pole designating failure and disspointment.

Unlike other works, however, it would be quasi una fantasia to lay all of the blame at the feet of the defense.  At times during the 2008 season, the performance of the special teams and offense was in a word: pathetic.

If the primary purpose of the defense is to prevent the opposition from scoring, the defense’s secondary task is to return the ball to its offensive unit prestissimo.  Since football is a series of possessions, the following comparisons examine the frequency with which teams achieve scores per possession:

                                                                 NFL average          DC offense          DC defense

TD / possession                                        18.7%                     21.4%                  15.8%

Score / possesion                                      32.8%                     35.4%                  35.8%

Notice the relatively low percent of touchdowns per possession, but that scores per possession are well over the NFL average.  Adding the number of first downs surrendered, the probability of a team stringing together first downs to score touchdowns can be deduced:

                                                                 NFL average          DC offense          DC defense

1st down(s) needed to score                      3.7                          3.714                   5.0

Probability of making 1st downs for TD  .1872                      .2135                   .1563

The similarity between the TD / possession statistic and the probability of making 1st downs for TD validates the fact that drives should be considered a series of first downs (http://www.advancednflstats.com/2007/09/importance-of-field-position.html).  Since the Dallas defense significantly outperforms the NFL average in stopping touchdown drives,  another factor is probably casuing the defense to give up more points than the average NFL team.

As I alluded to in my last post (http://www.bloggingtheboys.com/2009/7/13/947533/dont-run-with-scissors), the underlying counter-melody to the 2008 season was the inability of the Cowboys defense to overcome adversity.  According to the data in that post, when the Cowboys committed a defensive penalty, the opponent converted a first down on that drive a remarkable 90% of the time.

The undoing of the Dallas defense was its inability to overcome poor field position.  While the defensive penalties were soli performed by defensive players, field position is a composition of the defense (not stopping an opponent), the offense (not moving the ball or turning it over), and of the special teams (not playing well).

On average, the Cowboys offense started drives at the Dallas 30-yard line.  Opponents, on the other hand had an average starting field position at their 33-yard line.  Three yards seems insignificant, but it translates to roughly one-quarter of the opponent drives leading to field goal attempts.

By losing three yards of field position per possession (12 possessions per game), the opponent started every third drive needing one fewer first down to enter scoring position.  Consequently, the probability that the opponent would score a touchdown rose from less than 16% to almost 23% on those drives.

The inability of the defense to cope with poor field position cost the team more than two points per game.  Add that to the estimated 4.6 points per game lost due to penalties, and Dallas was giving up almost a touchdown per game because of field position and defensive penalties.

Further hammering this point home is the fact that the Cowboys went 4-6 in games where Dallas had worse starting average field position.  In those 10 games, the Dallas defense permitted an average of 21.6 points per game. 

Conversely, the Cowboys won 5 and lost only one of the games where the defense was given more of an opportunity to stop the opposition from scoring because of better starting field position.  In those remaining six contests, the Dallas defense permitted opponents to average only 18 points per game.

As noted above, the opus of the Cowboys offense had a major part in making it hard on the defense.  Tomy Romo and the Dallas offense turned the ball over 28 times (not including turnovers leading to opponent defensive touchdowns and a muffed punt).  The average field position following a Dallas turnover that was recovered within the field of play was the opponents’ own 47-yard line.

Opponents scored 79 points following turnovers downed within the field of play.  Seven of those scores were touchdowns, while 10 were field goals.

Cowboys turnovers contributed to poor field position in 2008, but turnovers accounted for only roughly 15% of opponent possessions.  If field position were truly too much for the defense to overcome, I would expect higher percentages of touchdowns per possession following turnovers that were recovered within the field of play.

The Dallas defense gave up a touchdown approximately 24% of the time on possessions following a turnover.  That is significantly higher than the overall 15.8% achieved throughout the season (which would have been an outstanding 14.2% sans the turnovers).

Further proof that the flat play of the Dallas defense could not overcome poor field position is the fact that the defense had roughly the same field goal rate per possession following a turnover (26%), than it did usually (23%).  The opposition scored on 18 of the 28 turnovers committed by the Dallas offense, or just over 64% of the time: significantly higher than the 35.8% the Dallas defense had permitted throughout the 2008 season.

Much has been made of diminishing penalties and turnovers da capo in order to avoid an encore of the 2008 season.  Virtuoso play by the offense and the special teams will assist the defense to play sharper in 2009.  The Dallas defense, however, must improve in order for the team to make the playoffs and win at least one post season contest this upcoming season.

A defense that can overcome the adversity that inevitably will befall the unit during the upcoming season would also aid the Cowboys to emerge vittorioso.  Feel free to critique, ma non troppo.